security-poc — tvshare.lge.com — bash
⚠
Subdomain Takeover — Active PoC
This domain has been claimed by the LGE Security Analysis Team as part of an authorized red team assessment.
If you reached this page unexpectedly, this domain was previously abandoned and is now under security team control.
Target Domain
tvshare.lge.com
Vulnerability Type
NS Record Dangling
Subdomain Takeover
Original AWS Resource
Deleted / Deprovisioned
Route 53 Hosted Zone
Discovery Date
2026-04-12
LGE Security Analysis Team
Recon & Takeover Timeline
Step 1 [RECON] Queried NS records — dig NS tvshare.lge.com → NS entries exist in corporate DNS
Step 2 [VERIFY] Queried NS directly — SERVFAIL / no response → NS does not recognize this domain
Step 3 [CRIT] NS mismatch confirmed — Route 53 hosted zone no longer exists
Step 4 [EXPLOIT] Created new Route 53 hosted zone for tvshare.lge.com — succeeded without restriction
Step 5 [CRIT] NS values matched corporate DNS entry — full DNS control acquired
Step 6 [DEPLOY] A record pointed to attacker-controlled EC2 — web server deployed
Step 7 [DONE] TLS certificate issued via Let's Encrypt — HTTPS active on hijacked subdomain
What a real attacker could do from here
Assessed by LGE Security Analysis Team
Contact redteam@lge.com
Classification Internal — Authorized Red Team PoC
✓ Authorized Assessment
tvshare.lge.com — Security PoC
security-poc — tvshare.lge.com — bash
⚠
Subdomain Takeover — Active PoC
This domain has been claimed by the LGE Security Analysis Team as part of an authorized red team assessment.
If you reached this page unexpectedly, this domain was previously abandoned and is now under security team control.
Target Domain
tvshare.lge.com
Vulnerability Type
NS Record Dangling
Subdomain Takeover
Original AWS Resource
Deleted / Deprovisioned
Route 53 Hosted Zone
Discovery Date
2026-04-12
LGE Security Analysis Team
Recon & Takeover Timeline
Step 1 [RECON] Queried NS records — dig NS tvshare.lge.com → NS entries exist in corporate DNS
Step 2 [VERIFY] Queried NS directly — SERVFAIL / no response → NS does not recognize this domain
Step 3 [CRIT] NS mismatch confirmed — Route 53 hosted zone no longer exists
Step 4 [EXPLOIT] Created new Route 53 hosted zone for tvshare.lge.com — succeeded without restriction
Step 5 [CRIT] NS values matched corporate DNS entry — full DNS control acquired
Step 6 [DEPLOY] A record pointed to attacker-controlled EC2 — web server deployed
Step 7 [DONE] TLS certificate issued via Let's Encrypt — HTTPS active on hijacked subdomain
What a real attacker could do from here
Assessed by LGE Security Analysis Team
Contact redteam@lge.com
Classification Internal — Authorized Red Team PoC
✓ Authorized Assessment
DNS MISCONFIGURATION SIMULATION

⚠ DNS MISCONFIGURATION SIMULATION ⚠

Scenario Overview

This simulation demonstrates a common real-world issue:

AWS resources were removed, but DNS records were not cleaned up.

Result: orphaned / dangling DNS configuration remains active.

Architecture State

Domain Registrar
NS Delegation
AWS Resource (DELETED)

Security Impact

✔ Broken DNS resolution paths

✔ Potential subdomain takeover exposure

✔ Traffic misrouting risk

Key Lesson

Always remove DNS records when decommissioning cloud resources.

Maintain NS ownership hygiene and periodic audits.

Educational Simulation Only • No real systems are being accessed or controlled